After moving through the uniform and organisation of the cavalry forces during the Barbarossa campaign, this part will be about the combat operations of the Mobile Corps and the Carpathian Group in the Soviet Union, some more OOBs and a short analysis on how effective these units were.
But first of all, after the first post I got some questions, I try to answer here:
MGs and HMGs and other weapons – what were they in reality: during 1941 the following weapons were used by the HRA: MG: 31M Solothurn (in 1943 Hungary ordered 2000-2000 24/43M Madsen and MG-34 machineguns); HMG: 07/31M Schwarzlose; heavy AT rifle: the 20mm 36M Solothurn rifle; AT guns: the 37mm 36M guns or PaK-36 in German; AA autocannons: 40mm 36M Bofors gun; AA guns: 80mm 29M and 29/38M Bofors gun; 105mm howitzer: the German 10,5cm leFH 18.
Leadership of subunits: I tried to look through my sources on which ranks led which subunits and came up with the following. Note, that this is not an official description, only what I could put together from different diaries and logs. Leadership and 2nd in command often changed in combat operations (loss of officers and the NCOs got more experience).
Regiment: colonel
Battalion: lieutenant colonel, major
Company: lieutenant, captain
Platoon: warrant officer, sergeant in some cases
Squad: corporal, sergeant
Logistical column: captain, lieutenant
Hungary joining the war against the Soviet Union
The fact that Hungary will join the Axis forces against the Soviet Union was not evident on nor the German, nor the Hungarian side. There is still much debate and unanswered questions until today. So let’s see both sides reason pro and contra on joining the campaign:
When Hitler issued his order #21 in December 1940, he only calculated with Romanian and Finnish participation in Barbarossa. The generals reported that this could cause a 200 km gap between German and Romanian units, which could be only filled if Hungary send troops or at least let the German forces attack from Hungarian territory. The problem with a Hungarian attack, from a military point of view, that the Germans thought the HRA needs some development before the operation, so the political leadership will need to persuade the Hungarian government on army modernisation and preparation for a war against the Soviets, without telling them too much about the plans (in contrast, some sources state that the HRA general staff knew about the Barbarossa since around December 1940 as German command informed them secretly). However, the political leadership had another problem: if they ask for Hungarian military involvement, then the Hungarian government will have every right to ask for further territories to be given back from their pre-WW1 borders, especially in Transylvania, which could let to a conflict of interest between Romania, Hungary, and Germany. Romania with her oil and wheat supply, was more than just a military ally for Germany and keeping them within the Axis was a high priority for German diplomacy. This was also known for the Hungarian government, and prime minister László Bárdossy even told the German ambassador, that they don’t understand why was it not necessary for Romania to send troops during the Balkan conflict while military intervention was specifically requested from Hungary? All in all, both the political and military leadership did not ask for Hungarian military help in the coming operation.
From the Hungarian side the question of joining the attack had different arguments. The HRA’s number one objective and its basis of design was to protect the country against is neighbours, the Little Entente. The political leadership had a strong commitment on getting back all territories taken away after the Great War but did not want to find themselves in a situation when most of the army is fighting on far away battlefields while the Slovakians or Romanians attack the country. On the other side the Chief of Staff of the HRA, general Henrik Werth, was a German friendly soldier, who on side knew, that with joining the attack against Yugoslavia, Hungary was part of the Axis whether they liked it or not. He also assumed, that if Hungary is not taking part in the coming offensive, then when the Soviet Union is defeated, Germany will favour Romanian and Slovakian requests. The Hungarian PM officially denied the request of Werth to join the attack but allowed him to start preparations for increased protection on the borders, in case the Soviets would attack the troops there and try to cut into two pieces the Axis’s front. When the operation was launched on 22nd June 1941, the German ambassador informed the Hungarian government in the morning and delivered Hitler’s letter to Regent Horthy. Still neither side could decide on the intervention which caused further annoyance for the German generals, who were afraid because of the gap in their lines. On the 23rd June the PM’s council decided on ceasing diplomatic relations between Hungary and the USSR. On 24th the PM had a meeting with the German ambassador about military intervention, but because of the above reasons, the German side did not ask for anything specifically and the Hungarian side did not want to go to war without any territorial promises. The German command ask Hitler on the 25th for at least a show of force by the HRA at the border, so the southern units of the German 17th army could catch their breath. Hitler did not forward the request.
From 22nd to 25th June the HRA’s VIII corps (with the 1st mountain brigade and the 8th frontier guard brigades plus with other smaller units and an air force detachment) reinforced border protection: closed the crossing points and paths with obstacles, forward elements were deployed etc., however after the Soviet troops were withdrawn to an 8-10 km depth, further fortifications were halted. Anti-air units’ alert was increased both on the Soviet and Slovakian borders. On 26th June at 12:40 3 planes with red stars on them attacked a train on Hungarian territory (between Rahó and Tiszaborkút) and caused 1 dead and 12 wounded. At 13:07 unknown planes bombed the city of Kassa (today Košice, Slovakia). Due to failures in alarm and air protection, 32 civilians died and 280 were injured. The nationality of those planes is still not known, there are many theories, as both the Russians and the Germans had reasons pro and contra, but there has been no ironclad evidence revealed for the historians. However, the chief of staff of the HRA and the defence minister assumed that the planes were Soviet, informed the Regent about that and asked for the approval for a declaration of war. On the 27th the PM Bárdossy informed the Parliament, that Hungary and the Soviet Union is at war. Mobilisation orders were sent out for the units of the Mobile Corps.
Combat operations during Barbarossa
By the order of the general staff on 30th June the Carpathian Group was formed under the command of lieutenant general Ferenc Szombathelyi and under the direct control of the HRA’s chief of staff. The Group contained 3 brigades of the Mobile Corps led by major general Béla dálnoki Miklós, the 1st mountain brigade, the 8th frontier guard brigade and the train and staff units of the VIII corps. The total strength of the Group was 3355 officers, 89760 soldiers, 21265 horses, 3308 carts and 5858 vehicles. Their main task was to fill the gap between the German army groups and reach the river Dniester. The order was to commence attack on 7 o’clock 1st July with the 1st mountain and 8th frontier guard brigades, plus with the support of 2nd motorised brigade. However, the order found the units in surprise, only 80% strength of the Mobile Corps arrived (a good example is the 1st cavalry brigade, whose combat units reached a Ukrainian village at the end of 1st July, but their supply units only left Budapest at the same time). This caused that the attack was more improvised then planned, especially as heavy rains arrived, and the mountain fords destroyed most of the bridges on them.
As the Soviet troops withdrew during the nights before, there were no serious opposition to the troops, but still they managed to blow up 21 bridges and other parts of the local infrastructure, plus create extra obstacles on the roads. Cavalry had an advantage as they could move faster on the poor, rainy roads, than the motorised or cyclist troops. After heavy fights the Hungarian units occupied several Russian villages and cities, like Horodenka. On the 7th July the VIII bicycle battalion captured the bridges over the river Siret and monitored the Russian withdrawal. The main task of the Carpathian Group at this time was to maintain connection between German and Romanian units and try to stop the withdrawing Russian troops. To reach this, the Mobile Corps developed a new tactic: the two motorised brigades were deployed on parallel roads, while the cavalry brigade positioned itself between them. The recon units of the motorised brigades were reinforced with light tank, sapper and traffic control platoons, an artillery battery, an extra rifle company and Bofors AA autocannons. The second echelon was a motorised rifle battalion, while the third one was the rest of the brigade, plus the rear guard after them. The theory was to hit the Russian troops on the front or outflank them. However, due to the fierce fighting and bravery of the Russian soldiers, this tactic was countered by ambushes. Poor roads and logistical problems also not helped the situation for the Hungarian units, and the lack of experience of the Hungarian officers caused further avoidable casualties and loss of equipment. From 9th July the Mobile Corps were redeployed under the direct command of the German Army Group South, while the rest of the Carpathian Group remained in the occupied territory as security forces. This closed the first phase of the Hungarian combat activities during the campaign. The main objective, to seize the river crossings of the Dniester, was not fulfilled.
The next phase was between the 9th July and 10th August, when the Mobile Corps with the German units fought successfully with the withdrawing Soviet troops until reaching the river Bug. During this phase the marching speed difference between the different unit types, like motorised infantry and cavalry, started to cause operational problems. During the battle of Uman the 1st motorised brigade managed to close a cauldron of Russian troops despite the slow movement of the Romanian and German units.
From 10th till 16th August the Corps took part in the battle of Nikolayev, the two motorised brigades defeated three Soviet divisions on a 30-40 km wide frontline, then captured the town Nikolayev. During this time, the Hungarian units changed formation and attacked with a thin battle line, which was several times penetrated by Russian rear echelon units. The cooperation between the Hungarian ground and air units was outstanding, the air force even managed to maintain air supremacy over the town. However due to the heat, horse losses were enormous in cavalry units. After the battle the Corps got some time to regroup and resupply.
The battle of Nikolayev was the place of a famous Hungarian cavalry charge: mayor Kálmán Mikecz and his cavalry combat group (according to witnesses it was a hussar regiment) got a task to capture the field 4 km from the train tracks going into Nikolayev and to stop the withdrawal of the Russian troops into north-eastern direction. The German units tried to capture a railway embankment where Russian units were dig in, but they already failed 4 times. Suddenly the Hungarian hussars arrived on their horses. First the German soldiers laughed at them, but they changed their opinion later. As the terrain was open the mayor ordered the companies to charge the enemy, with armoured car support on their flanks. The hussars started to ride with increasing speed while drawing their swords. As they were charging with glowing swords, the Russian soldiers got frightened, jumped up and tried to run away, leaving their position undefended. The cavalry managed to reach them and many Russians were slain.
The next phase was a different kind of combat operations: from 30th August to 6th September were the river protection activities on the Dnieper. Here, the Hungarian units managed to stop the Russian breakthrough attempts but with only great losses.
During the operation to reach the Donets cavalry and bicycle troops did not take part as they were withdrawn from the front line. The operation from 10th to 28th October exhausted the remaining supply and reserve of the Corps. Only the armoured vehicles and Botond trucks managed to travel on the wet and muddy roads (during the last week only the infantry could do that) which depleted the Corps’ combat strength into 6 battalions. Due to the Russian withdrawal order on the 19th October the Hungarians could fulfil their tasks in this phase too.
This was followed by the withdrawal of the rest of the Corps into Hungary. The Mobile Corps lost 100% of the tankettes, 80% of the tanks, most of the horses, 1200 vehicles, 28 artillery guns and 21 aircrafts. Out of the 44.444 men ‘only’ 855 were killed, 277 were missing or captured, there were 2288 wounded and 1000 sick. Altogether the human losses was around 10% of the original strength.
The order of battle of the of the Mobile Corps 1941-1942 and other units of the Carpathian Group (the amount of weapons could vary in reality and there are some differences between the sources too):
Carpathian Group
1st mountain brigade
brigade command
1-4. mountain battalion, each:
- 3 rifle companies, each with:
- company command
- 3 rifle platoons, each with 12 MG, 1 heavy AT rifle, 2 mortars
- HMG platoon with 4 HMG
- mortar platoon with 2 mortars
- train
- 1 HMG company with 12 HMG
- 1 mountain artillery battery with 8 mountain guns
- 1 sapper platoon
- 1 radio platoon
- 1 mortar platoon with 6 mortars
AT platoon with 2 AT guns
independent hussar company with:
- company command
- train (3 carts, 1 moving kitchen)
- 2 hussar platoons with 2-2 MG
- motorcycle squad with 4 motorcycles
- R/3 radio patrol (1 NCO, 3 hussars, 4 horses plus 1 train horse, 1 radio)
motorcycle platoon with 4 motorcycles
armoured car platoon with 4 armoured cars
radio company
sapper company
train
8th frontier guard brigade
brigade command
7 frontier guard battalions, each with (the number of personnel varied, there were low number battalion with 300-500 persons and high number ones with 600-1000 persons):
- battalion command
- 3 rifle companies, each with
- 16 MG
- 1 heavy AT rifle
- 2 mortars
- 1 HMG company with 12 HMG
- 1 bicycle company with 12 MG, 2 HMG, 140 bicycles
- 1 raiding company
- 1 sapper platoon
- 1 radio platoon
- 1 heavy AT rifle platoon with 2 heavy rifles
- infantry artillery platoon with 2 infantry artillery guns
- 1 mortar platoon with 2 mortars
- economic office
XVIII. artillery battery
VIII. towed howitzer battery
VIII. AA artillery battery
VIII. engineer battalion
VIII. radio battalion
VIII. cavalry company
VIII. close recon air company
Mobile Corps
Corps command
1st mobile radio company
VI. and VIII. bicycle battalions, each with:
– 2 bicycle companies, each with 12 MG
– 1 heavy weapons company with 6 HMG and 2 81mm mortars
– 1 tankette company with 6 Ansaldo tankettes
– 1 AT gun company with 4 37mm AT guns
– 1 sapper platoon
– 1 radio platoon
V. towed howitzer battalion
– 1 howitzer battery with 5 15cm howitzers
– 1 artillery battery with 4 10,5cm towed artillery guns
I. and V. towed AA artillery battalions, each with:
– 2-2 AA artillery batteries, each with 4 8cm AA artillery guns
VIII. towed AA artillery battalion:
– 2 AA autocannon batteries, each with 4 40mm AA autocannons
– 1 AA artillery battery with 4 8cm AA artillery guns
152nd motorised engineer battalion with 2 motorised engineer companies
150th signal battalion:
– 3 heavy cable companies
– 1 light cable company
– 2 R-16 radio companies
corps train:
– 1 engineer column
– 5 heavy truck columns
– 1 food supply column
– 1 truck repair column
– 1 fuel transport column
– 2 injured transport columns
– 1 medical column
– 1 bacteriological station
– 1 foraging column
– 1 ammo handler column
– 1 supply collector station
– 1 towed bakery column
– 1 personal control station
– 1 mobile bridge column
– 1 towing column
1st cavalry brigade
brigade command
3rd and 4th hussar regiments, each:
- 6 cavalry companies, each with 12 MG
- 1 HMG company with 12 HMG
- 1 AT gun company with 4 37mm AT guns
- 1 horse battery with 4 7,5cm 15/31M mountain guns
- 1 radio platoon
- 1 sapper platoon
13th and 14th bicycle battalion, each:
- 3 bicycle companies, each with 12 MG
- 1 motorised heavy weapons company with 6 HMG and 2 81mm mortars
- 1 tankette company with 6 Ansaldo tankettes
- 1 AT gun company with 4 37mm AT guns
- 1 sapper platoon
- 1 radio platoon
1st horse artillery battalion
- 2 light gun batteries, each with 4 8cm light field guns
3rd motorised artillery battalion
- 2 light howitzer batteries, each with 4 10,5cm light howitzers
1st cavalry armoured battalion
- 1 tankette company with 18 Ansaldo tankettes
- 1 light tank company with 18 Toldi light tanks
- 1 armoured car company with 16 Csaba armoured cars
1st horse AA autocannon battery with 6 40mm AA autocannons
1st cavalry radio company
3rd motorised sapper company
1st cavalry brigade supply column:
- 1 motorised HMG company with 6 HMG
- 3 car columns
- 1 horse supply column
- 1 engineer column
- half-half horse and motorised medical columns
- 1 ammo column
- 1 truck repair column
- 1 truck column for transporting the wounded
- 3 truck columns
- 1 motorised bakery column
1st and 2nd motorised brigade, each with:
brigade command
3 motorised battalions, each with:
- 3 rifle companies, each with 12 MG, 2 heavy AT rifles, 2 50mm mortars
- 1 heavy weapons company with 12 HMG, 4 81mm mortars, 4 37mm AT guns
- 1 radio platoon
- 1 sapper platoon
1 bicycle battalion:
- 3 bicycle companies, each with 12 MG and 206 bicycles
- 1 heavy weapons company with 6 HMG, 2 81mm mortars
- 1 tankette company with 6 Ansaldo tankettes
- 1 AT gun company with 4 37mm AT guns
- 1 sapper platoon
- 1 radio platoon
1 armoured battalion:
- 2 light tank companies, each with 18 Toldi light tanks
1 towed howitzer battalion:
- 4 howitzer batteries, each with 4 10,5cm howitzers
1 towed AA autocannon battery with 6 40mm AA autocannons
1 recon battalion:
- 1 motorised rifle company
- 1 tankette company with 18 Ansaldo tankettes
- 1 light armoured tank company with 18 Toldi light tanks
- 1 recon armoured car company with 16 Csaba armoured cars
1 radio company
1 engineer company
train:
- 1 motorised HMG company
- 1 wounded transport truck column
- 1 truck repair column
- 1 ammo handler column
- 1 food supply column
- 1 engineer column
- 1 truck column
Air support was provided for the Mobile Corps by the Air Force Group consisting of 24 fighters (Fiat CR-32, CR-42, Reggiane Re-2000), 12 bombers (Caproni Ca-135, Junkers Ju-86), 36 recon (Heinkel He-46, He-70, Weiss Manfréd WM-21) and some transport (Savoia Marcetti SM-75) planes.
Combat effectiveness of the cavalry and other mobile units
The first challenge for the Hungarian units during Barbarossa, was the mobilisation. There was a lack of trucks and other vehicles, so besides other units giving up their ones, even civilian vehicles were needed to be requisited. The timeframe was impossible, the units and supply deep inside Hungary could only join the combat later, which caused delays and supply problems in the whole operation.
If we look at the horses the situation was also not better. Many of the animals were from civilian contractors and were not breed and trained for combat operations. This, the hot weather, the long rides and sometimes even the bad design of the saddles caused a huge loss among their numbers. The other problem with the horses and bicycles were their speed. With normal or good road conditions they couldn’t keep up with the motorised and armoured columns. With muddy roads this situation sometimes changed. No matter which version appeared it caused serious problems for keeping the combat units together and moving them with the required speed. The bicycles and most of the trucks were also bad, only the Botonds could keep up with the other elements.
Besides the bad roads another problem, that the Hungarian leadership had to face, was the destroyed bridges and the lack of pioneer units. To solve this, infantry units were redeployed to repair tasks from the brigades.
The Toldi tanks, Ansaldo tankettes and Csaba armoured cars were only good against infantry as they had low AT value. The Ansaldos were even inefficient against the infantry too, and they were withdrawn from combat operations after Barbarossa.
A speciality of the terrain (large agricultural areas) meant that many smaller scale battles were fought among tall vegetation or in small forests. Surprise night attacks were also often used by both sides with good results.
To speak about the positive things, it turned out that the use of artillery by the Hungarians was efficient and during the river protection task it meant that smaller units could withhold larger attacking Soviet forces. Another positive experience was the cooperation between ground and air units. After the evaluation of the operations in 1942 the conclusion was that the doctrine of 1939 was efficient, but the officers’ lack of combat experience meant that it was not used properly every time. Another experience was that the bicycle and cavalry units cannot be used mixed with armoured and motorised units. From 1942 the HRA decided on deleting the mobile units from the OOB and armoured and independent cavalry divisions were formed.
To sum up the soldiers of the Mobile Corps did everything they could for the success of Barbarossa. Their speed sometimes was better then the German one and they managed to defeat much larger enemy units. The quality and situation of their equipment and supply, compared to the sheer size of the enemy forces and the countryside, could only meant that the Mobile Corps will be burnt out at the end of the campaign. Still, the Hungarian soldier managed to keep up with the warriors of the great powers.
So that is all about the cavalry and other mobile HRA troops during Operation Barbarossa for the time being. When the Mobile Corps were deployed home it was disbanded. Besides the occupational forces the next combat unit entering the Soviet Union was the newly formed and equipped 2nd Hungarian Army, which reached its tragic end at the shores of the river Don, while the Germans tried to capture the infamous city of Stalingrad. But that story is for another time.
Some more videos:
Keitel visited Hungary in February 1942 as part of his programme, he took part in the ceremonial inspection of the Mobile Corps units, that took part in Operation Barbarossa:
https://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4509
What you can see: Different branches of the Mobile Corps, the vehicles and armament.
The return of the Mobile Corps and the award ceremony in Budapest in December 1941:
https://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=4462
What you can see: uniforms, equipment and vehicles of the Corps
For non-Hungarian speakers I cannot recommend enough time the book from Peter Mujzer: Huns on Wheels; Hungarian Mobile Forces in WWII. For more information or pictures, check his facebook page (link in the sources)!
Other sources:
Huns on Wheels facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/Huns-on-Wheels-1580549015526531
Peter Mujzer: Huns on Wheels; Hungarian Mobile Forces in WWII
Szabó Péter, Számvéber Norbert: A Keleti Hadszíntér és Magyarország 1941-1943 (The Eastern Front and Hungary 1941-1943)
Fröhlich Dávid: Huszárok, előre! Magyar sereglovasság a II. világháborúban (Hussars, forward! Hungarian cavalry in the 2nd World War)
dr. Tóth László: A Magyar Királyi Honvédség egyenruhái 1926-1945 (The Hungarian Royal Army’s uniforms 1926-1945)
Dr. Lengyel Ferenc: A Magyar Királyi Honvédség első háborús éve (1941) (The HRA’s first year in the war (1941))
A Don partjáig és vissza: Emlékek és fényképek a magyar királyi 2. hadsereg 1942-1943. évi hadműveleteiről (To the Don and back: Memories and photos of the combat operations of the Hungarian royal 2nd army in 1942-1943)
Andaházi Szeghy Viktor: A magyar királyi I. gyorshadtest 1941. évi ukrajnai hadműveletei (The Hungarian royal I. mobile corps’ Ukrainian combat operations in 1941); PhD thesis work
Minis with moustaches 